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Summary findings
Herrera and Garcia develop an early warning system for  Statistically, Type I and Type II errors are smaller than
macroeconomic vulnerability for several Latin American  those reported  in previous papers.
countries, drawing on the work of Kaminsky, Lizondo,  Operationally, this system of leading indicators is less
and Reinhart (1997) and Kaminsky (1988).  costly to maintain, given fewer variables - which are
They build a composite leading indicator that signals  widely available and reported with timeliness.
macroeconomic vulnerability, showing that, historically,  Herrera and Garcia tested the models' out-of-sample
crises tend to happen in certain "vulnerable" situations.  predictive ability on crises that occurred after the first
Interested mainly in providing an operational tool,  stage of their project was finished: Colombia (September
Herrera and Garcia use a different approach to the  1998), Brazil (January 1999), and Ecuador (February
problem than Kaminsky did. First, they use fewer  1999). In all cases the models correctly anticipated the
variables to generate the signals. Then, after the variables  speculative attacks.
are aggregated, a signal is issued, depending on the  Moreover, Mexico's models, estimated with
behavior of the composite index. (Kaminsky's procedure  information  available two years before the  1994 crisis,
was to generate signals with each variable and then  show that these signaling devices would have been useful
aggregate them.)  for signaling the macroeconomic vulnerability before
Their results are satisfactory both statistically and  December 1994.
operationally.
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the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact Conrado Garcia, room 18-146,  telephone 202-
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It turns out that an eerie type of chaos can lurk just  behind a facade  of order-and yet,
deep inside the chaos lurks an even eerier type of order.  Douglas Hofstadter
I. Introduction
The object of this paper is to develop an early warning system (EWS) of a country's
macroeconomic fragility.  The  idea is  to have  an instrument  that helps  policymakers
identify and anticipate situations in which crises are more likely to happen, in the vein of
the  leading indicators  literature.  Previous  work has  already  been  done  in  this  area,
mainly by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997), and Kaminsky (1998).  There are
three main differences between our paper and previous ones upon which it is based:
a) The main interest is to have an operational tool . The ultimate objective is to build the
simplest  possible  EWS  to  be  updated  monthly  at  the  lowest  feasible  cost.  Data
i Paper  presented  in the XVII Latin  American  Meeting  of the Econometric  Society,  in Cancun,  August,
1999.
We thank Sara  Calvo,  Norman  Loayza,  Guillermo  Perry,  and Carmen  Reinhart  for insightful  comments.2
availability on a timely basis was a crucial determinant of the set of variables employed.
Our  work  in  this  stage  was  based  on  papers  by  Eichengreen,  Rose  and  Wyploz 2,
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart 3 (KLR), Kaminsky4 and the IMF5.
b) The aggregation method of the individual leading indicators into a composite inceex;
and the way this  index is used as a signaling device.  Kaminsky  (1998) construcls a
composite index by aggregating signals of the different indicators.  We take a diffeient
approach in aggregating the variables and then generating the signals depending on the
behavior of the composite index.  The reason for adopting this strategy is that we beli -eve
that for a crisis to take place the set of leading indicators must jointly  drift in the sa.mrte
direction over some period of time.
c) The exclusive focus on LAC countries, estimating the models and showing details on
a country by country basis that other papers do not present due to the large number of
countries in their pane]  s.
With this  in mind, the paper has four  sections besides this  introduction: the  first one
identifies  crises  periods,  or  periods  of  unusual  market  volatility,  based  on  monithly
information for the period  from  1980 to  June,1998.  The second  section presents  the
leading indicators and the aggregation procedures that will allow identifying regularii:ics
in pre-crisis periods  We build four different  signal-generating  mechanisms,  three of
which have previously been used and a fourth one that is novel in this paper.  The tLird
chapter evaluates the  alternative filtering mechanisms for  each country. showing tlhat,
even though different criteria lead to different model selection outcomes, the new methtod
proposed in this paper leads to the minimum Type I error.  The recent crisis in BraziL,
Ecuador and Colombia are used to test the out of sample predictive ability of the mdcl
with  good results.  The  fourth  and  last  section  summarizes  the  results,  stressing  the
usefulness of these types of leading indicators methodology but it also points out its rri  ain
limitations.
II.  Periods  of Unusual  Market  Volatility
This section seeks to determine the "crises" periods, in order to study the behavior of :)ur
leading indicators prior to  their occurrence. In line with most of the literature on l his
topic, we define an Index of Speculative Pressure (ISP)  as follows:
ISP  = A%  exchange  rate +  A%  interest  rates  - A% intemational  reserves
All the variables (expressed in monthly percentage changes) were standardized to h~.v-
mean zero and unit vaiiance.  We avoided the issue of weighting differently each of 1he
2 Eichengreen, B., A. Rose and C. Wyploz (1996) "Contagious currency crises: first tests". Scandinaviar
Journal of Economics, 98, 4, 463-484.
3 Kaminsky, G., S. Lizondo and C. Reinhart (1997)"Leading indicators of currency crises" Policy Reseacbe
Working Paper 1852, The World Bank
4Kaminsky,  G, (1998) "Currency and banking crises: A composite leading indicator" Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System Working Paper.
5IMF  (1998) World Econornic Outlook, Chapter IV, "Financial crises: characteristics and indicators of
vulnerability'.3
variables, but Eichengreen's  sensitivity analysis to different weighting patterns indicate
there should be no major changes expected.
A crisis is defined as a period in which  ISP t >  u  + 1.5a  (where  u  is the sample mean
and  cr the standard deviation of the ISP).  Table 1 summarizes the dates when the ISP
surpasses the threshold.  For countries experiencing hyperinflation (Argentina, Brazil and
Peru), different thresholds were calculated both for these episodes and for more stable
periods 6. A total of 64 crises result and will be used in the analysis.
Table 1
Periods of Excessive Market Volatility in Several LAC Countries
1980:01-1998:04
Argentina  83:12; 89:04-05; 89:12; 90:02; 91:12; 92:11; 95:03
Brazil  82:09; 87:01-02; 89:06; 89:11-12:90:01-02;  90:11;91:09; 94:04-06; 95:03;
97:10
Chile  82:06-11; 83:03; 84:10-11; 85:07; 89:04-06; 92:04; 98:01
Colombia  84:01-04;  85:01-05;  86:09;  90:10:  92:08;  95:08;  97:09
Ecuador  81:12; 82:05; 83:03; 84:01; 85:12; 86:08; 88:07-08; 89:07; 90:01; 91:01; 92:05;
93:06; 95:02
Mexico  82:02-06; 82:12; 85:07; 87:12; 90:03; 94:04; 94:12; 95:01; 95:03; 95:10
Peru  81:01;  83:07;  87:10-12;  88:03-09;  90:03;92:04-10;  93:01
Venezuela  84:02;  86:12;  89:02-03;  90:07;  94:05;  95:12;  96:04; 98:01
III.  Leading  Indicators  of Crisis  and  Signal-Generating  Mechanisms
There is a wide  set of options regarding which variables to use and how to use them.
Concerning  the  variables  to  use,  the  IMF  (WEO,  ch.  IV)  narrowed  the  list  to  3:
M2/Reserves, real domestic  credit growth, and the real  exchange rate.  We will also
include, alternatively, the inflation rate due to the consistency of this variable in papers
by A. Demirguc-Kunt and E. Detragiache 7 on determinants of banking crises.
Following the IMF procedure, we  construct an  index of macroeconomic vulnerability
(IMV)  with  these  variables,  standardized  to  have  mean  zero  and  unit  variance,
circumventing the issue of weighting the individual indicators differently.
IMV= REER + DCG + M2/R + ,z
REER  Real effective exchange rate
DCG  Domestic credit Growth in real terms
M2/R =  M2/International reserves
;T  =  Inflation
6 For Argentina  2 sub-samples  were  used:  1980:01-91:06  and 91:07-98:03;  for Brazil,  two sub-samples
80:01-94:06  and 94:07-98:03.  And for Peru, 3 sub-samples  were used 1980:01-1988:07,  88:08-91:08,
91:09-98:04.
7  Asli Demirguc-Kunt  and Enrica Detragiache  (1997) "Banking Crises around the World: Are there
Common  Threads?"4
This aggregation method differs from Kaminsky's  since the signals are extracted from
the behavior of our composite index, while in her case each individual variable generates
signals that are then aggregated into the composite index.  Our  aggregation procedure
assumes that the leading  variables drift more or less in the same direction, or have a
common element in their behavior prior to the crisis.  If this is not the case, it will not be
a good indicator.  For example, if the real exchange rate appreciates (increases) but there
is a contraction in domestic credit growth, our IMV may not change and hence no signal
will be issued.
Once the composite  index of macroeconomic vulnerability  (IMV)  is built,  its  sinmple
evolution is not informative enough about a potential risk situation.  Thresholds have.,  to
be used in assessing when the IMV has reached an "anomalous" level.
We applied four transformations or filters to the IMV to generate signals: detrending the
variable with respect to its  long-run level (defined as the Hodrick-Prescott trend), the
variable in levels (no iFilter),  detrending the variable with respect to a short-run (6 mos.)
moving average and thLe  residuals of an ARIMA model fitted to the IMV.  The first three
(or variants) have been used  in other papers while the ARIMA residuals  approach is
novel, and produced the lowest Type I error (probability of not  anticipating the crisis).
Initially  we  focus  on  the  IMV  as  described  above,  to  make  our  sample  period  as
comparable as possible to that of other papers. In a second stage stock market prices in
real  terms  are  included  as  an  additional  leading  variable,  but the  sample period  is
shortened to 1986-199,8  due to availability of consistent information from the IFC on this
variable for most of the sample countries.
A. Deviations from trend model  (DT model)
This model uses deviations from a long run trend to generate signals.  To determine wriat
the long run trend of a series is, the IMF used a 3-year moving average, but we prefer-ed
the  Hodrick-Prescott  filter  since  the  first  procedure  induces  autocorrelation  to  he
detrended series.  This is an undesirable feature since once the mechanism sends a sigi a;,
it will tend to produce signals in successive periods.  On the other hand, the Hodrilk-
Prescott filter induces spurious cycle behavior when applied to non-stationary data  so we
have to be aware of this phenomenon induced by the detrending procedure.
The deviations from the trend for each of the variables were standardized and aggregaled
to build the Index of M/Iacro  Vulnerability (IMV).  The index was computed alternatively,
including inflation or not, and based  on simple Granger causality tests  between thl,  se
indexes and the crises with lags up to 24months, the best index was chosen.  Inflation was
an informative variable only in the cases of Argentina and Mexico.  This IMV signal i a
crisis when it surpasses a threshold determined by the mean plus 1.5 standard deviatiors.
8 Cogley,  T. and J. Nason (1995)  "Effects  of the Hodrick-Prescott  filter on trend  and difference  stationary
time series:  Implications  for business  cycle  research",  Journal  of Economic  Dynamics  and Control, 19,
pp.253-278.5
A characteristic of all the computed IMVs is that their volatilities change through time.
Most  of the  indexes were  particularly  volatile  from the  mid eighties  until  the  early
nineties, so the standard deviations that were used were computed from the conditional
variance  of  the  series  estimated  by  a  Generalized  Autoregressive  Conditional
Heteroskedastic (GARCH) model 9. The feature  of these types  of models  is that the
variance of the IMV is taken to be an ARMA process that is estimated simultaneously
with the mean of the series.  The GARCH (p,q) model that was used for all the countries
wasi°:
IMVt=  ao+aiIMVti+et
et=  vt  h  v is white noise with  I-=1
q  2  p
and h, = a+  aie,  +  h,-i
With the conditional standard deviations, the threshold was computed and the signaling
device is complete.
B. The levels model (simple model)
An implicit assumption in the previous model is that temporary departures of variables
from their trend provide information regarding future crises but the trend itself is not an
informative variable about the macroeconomic vulnerability of a country.  Because this
might  imply  discarding  useful  information  we  computed  the  IMV  index  with  the
variables in levels.  In this case, inflation was an informative variable in all cases, except
for Chile and Colombia
The thresholds for the IMV were constructed with the conditional standard deviations of
GARCHI  models for each country's  IMV12, and the signaling mechanism is ready.  The
signal is flashed if the IMV exceeds the mean plus 1.5 standard deviations.
9  Developed  by Engle,  R. (1982)  "Autoregressive  conditional  heteroskedasticity  with estimates  of the
variance  of United  Kingdom  inflation",  Econometrica,  50, 987-1007  and Bollerslev,  T. "Generalized
autoregressive  conditional  heteroskedasticity",  Journal  of Econometrics,  31, 307-327.
'° The order  of p and  q varied  with each  country  as follows:  Argentina  6,1; Brazil  3,1; Chile  6,1; Colombia
3,0;  Ecuador  6,0; Mexico  3,1; Peru 1,1;  Venezuela  3,0.
" The IMV  was computed  as the sum of standardized  variables  (without  detrending)  including  inflation  or
not, and simple Granger  causality  tests  were used  to decide  which  was the best index  for each country.
12 The  procedure  is identical  to that described  in the DT model. In most cases  the whole  sample  period  was
split into sub-samples  implying different models.  The sub-samples and the orders of p and q are:
Argentina 1980-1988  (1,1); 1989-1991  (2,1); 1992-1998  (0,2). Brazil 1980-1985  (1,1), 1986-1991  (5,0),
1992-1998  (1,1); Chile 1980-1986  (2,1) 1987-1998  (1,1).  Colombia 1980-1998  (1,0). Ecuador 1980-1985
(1,1), 1986-1994  (1,1), 1995-1998  (1,1).  Mexico 1980-1983  (2,1), 1984-1995:02  (1,0),  1995:03-1998
(1,2). Peru 1980-87  (1,0) 1988-91  (1,0), 1992-98  (1,0). Venezuela  1980-82  (1,1) 1983-94  (1,1), 1995-98
(1,1)6
C.  The chartist model (moving average model)
The previous approach may be subject to criticism on the grounds that, since there are
several break-points in the sample that are known to the researcher ex-post, it is diffic.ult
from an operational viLewpoint  to know at every point in time if there has been a change
in the mean or variance models.  To avoid this problem, a simple approach coimcmnly
used by financial markets practitioners is to compare the variable (IMV) with its mo),irng
average.  Based on Granger causality tests, the 6-month moving average was selected.  A
signal is flashed when the IMV exceeds the 6-month moving average.
D. The ARIMA residuals model
Finally, one could hypothesize that a  crisis is more likely to  happen when the set of
leading  indicators  are  behaving  "strangely".  The  "normal"  or  regular  behavio:  is
described by an ARIMA model for the IMV, so the residuals summarize the deviations
from the "normal" behavior.  In theory, the residuals must be a white noise process and
have mean zero. But some residuals will randomly be positive.  We're interested in mrore
permanent positive deviations, so we constructed a moving average of the residuals and a
signal was generated when this statistic exceeds zero.  Conceptually, this filter is similar
to  applying  any  detrending  methodology,  except  that  it  considers  a  richer  set  of
information besides the trend in the variable's history.
IV.  Evaluation Criteria and Results
With the  four  models  described  above  (deviations  from  trend,  simple,  chartist  and
ARIMA residuals) different signals were generated. With their empirical clistributions,  as
well as those of the crises, we evaluated the models using a 24-month window prior to
each  crisis 13. Contemporaneous  signals were  not  counted  because they  are not  ':ad
signals and they are not leading  variables either.  Similarly if a crisis occurs withi l4
months of another one, they are counted as one episode.
A. Evaluation criteria
Our evaluation of each model is based on four 4 statistics; the sizes of Type I and Typt II
errors, the noise to signal ratio, and the probability that a crisis occurs given that a sigiial
was produced. A short description of each one and details on the computation follow:
We borrow a very useful table from Kaminsky-Lizondo and Reinhart (KLR) (1997) to
visualize the different criteria:
13 24 months  is the most common  size for the window. The results  don't change  dramatically  if an 18-
month  window  is used, but a noticeable  improvement  is achieved  with  the wider  one.7
Table 2
Possible Scenarios of Signals and Crisis
Crisis  No crisis
Signal issued  A  B
No signal issued  C  D
1. Types I and II errors.
If  H 0 = Crisis occurs
H a = No crisis occurs
Size of Type I error = P [reject Ho/ Ho is true]= Probability of not anticipating a crisis
Size of Type I error = C/(A+C)
Given that the null hypothesis is true (crisis occurs), the perfect signaling device would
send 24 signals (with a 24-month window).  The size of Type I error was computed as 1-
the number of signals prior to each crisis (as a ratio of 24).
Size of Type II error = P[not rejecting Ho/Ho is false]= Probability  of sending a  false
signal.
Size of Type II error = B/(B+D)
For every non-crisis period, the signals in the 24 month period prior to the each crisis are
counted and expressed as a ratio of the sum of the no signal-no crises (good signals) and
the signal-no crisis (false signal), given that no crisis occurred.
Since both types of errors are undesirable, a criterion that we will use is to select the
model that minimizes the sum of both.  An alternative rule will be to choose the model
that  minimizes  Type I  error,  given  that  it can  be  argued that  it  is more  costly not
anticipating the extreme risk situations.
2. The Noise/Signal ratio (NSR)
The Noise/Signal ratio (NSR) measures the false signals (size of Type II error) as a ratio
of the good signals issued (1- size of Type I error)
The selection rule is to pick the model that minimizes the NSR  for each country.  This
was the  criterion  followed by  Kaminsky  and  KLR  in  their  ranking  of  the  different
variables.
3.  Probability of a crisis given that a signal was issued P(C/S)
Given that models generate different signals, an alternative criterion is to select the model
that maximizes the probability of a crisis occurring given that a signal was issued.8
B.  Results
The four models (deviations from trend, the simple, chartist and ARIMA residuals) were
used for each of the 8 countries.  For each model the Type I and II errors, the Noise to
Signal Ratio (NSR), and the Probability of having a crisis given that a signal is issued
(P(C/S)) were  computed,  and the results  are summarized  in  Table  3.  Unconditional
probabilities of crises occurrence are also presented for each country, to allow gauriing
the  effectiveness of  the models  (TABLE 3  A).  Two  sample periods  are  presented
because in  a latter part of the paper we'll  work with  a shorter  sarnple period due  to
information availabilily of certain variables.
Argentina  0.86  0.14  0.99  0,61  0,84  0.29  1.80  044  0.77  036  1.57  054  0.55  0.37  0  .83  0.tS
Brazil  0.75  0.13  0.51  0.84 0a  s9  0.16  0.50  0.2  9.42  014  0.25  0,93  031  0.2T  0.39  80  .
C4lfe  0,72  0.15  0.52  :0.5  0;60  D.l1  0Q27  0.88  0.58  033  080  0  67  038  040  0  ,65  0.74
Cotomibia  0.60  f13  0.33  0. .9  0  3590.12  0.29  0.98  0.63  01 7  0.46  0.56  0.41  0.16  Ct2i  0.62
Ecuador  0.41  0.49  0.82  1 0.13  0.76  D0,  0,36  0.91  0,19  0.49  0.60  0.89  0.52  0.24  Ct49  0O.0
Mexico  0 T0  0.09  0.31  0 S5  0.52  0.08  0t17  0.91  0.51  0.43  0.69  00i  0.44  0.32  C 57  0.79
Peru  0.83  0.36  2.13  0.46  0.75  0.12  0.47  0.79  0.63  0D41  1.12  0.57  0.40  0.50  C.83  0.62
Venezuela  0.11  0.1  0,t1  0.,32  -0.74  0.05  0.19  0.9  0.58  0.50  1.1  0.70  A0.49  .62  1.20  0Q,7
Differenced  Arima residuals model.
Table 3A
Unconditional Crisis Probabilities in LAC Countries in Different Sample Periods
1980-1998  :1986-1998
Argentina  .037  .049
Brazil  .065  .092
Chile  .060  .028
Colombia  .047  .035
Ecuador  .065  .063
Mexico  .056  .049
Peru  .060  .077
Venezuela  .042  .0569
In general we observe (Table 3) high Type I errors and low Type II errors.  However,
compared to  Kaminsky's  and KLR's  results  (for individual  variables)'4,  the first  are
lower and  the second higher.  The NSR  is lower  here, and the P(C/S)  is very high,
especially when compared to the unconditional probability.
Table 4 presents the selection of the best model for each of the countries according to the
4 criteria: minimizing the  sum of the Type I and  II errors, minimizing  Type I  error,
minimizing the NSR  and maximizing P(C/S). In most  of the cases, the simple model
performs  the  best,  except  in  Argentina  where  the  deviations  from  trend  model
outperforms the rest, and Brazil where the chartist model is selected.  In Ecuador, the
chartist model is preferred because of the low Type I error.
Table 4
Model Selection According to Different Evaluation Citeria
(IMV period 1980-1998)
Mini. Type I  Min.  Type I  Min..  Mai.  P(C/S)
+Type II errors  error  Noise/S`igal
Argentina  Residuals  Residuals  Residuals  Residuals
Brazil  Residuals, Chartist  Residuals  Chartist  Chartist
Chile  Simaple  Residuals  Simple  Simple
Colombia  Residuals  Residuals  Residuals,  Simple  Residuals
Ecuador  Residuals  Chartist  Simple  Residuals,
Simple
Mexico  Simple  Residuals  Simple  Simple
Peru  Residuals,  Simple  Residuals  Simple  Simple
Venezuela  Simple  Residuals  Simple  Simple
One can think that the Type I error is too high, especially  in the case of Argentina  and
Ecuador,  where  it exceeds .5. These  models can be calibrated  to reduce  this error with a
combination of two procedures: first, by reducing the number of  crisis limiting the
analysis to the extreme cases where it was difficult not having any signals sent; and
second, by altering the signal generating mechanism in order to have more signals issued.
The first option implies changing  the definition  of crisis by setting  a higher threshold  for
the Index of Speculative  Pressure (ISP): instead of working with the mean plus 1.5
standard deviations  we'll work with 3 standard deviations. And in order to have more
signals sent we can lower the threshold  for the IMV: instead of working with the mean
plus 1.5 standard  deviations  we'll work  with one standard  deviation.
We followed  this approach  with the largest  economies  Argentina,  Brazil and Mexico and
obtained  significant  improvement  with respect  to the models  shown  in Table  4 in the case
14 KLR and  Kaminsky  report  type I and II errors,  N/S and P(C/S)  for individual  variables.  Kaminsky  does
not report  these  statistics  for the composite  indicator,  but shows  other  forecasting  evaluation  statistics.10
of Argentina, marginal improvement in the case of Mexico and none whatsoever in the
case of Brazil.  Table 5 summarizes the relevant statistics for the best models selected.
'1~~~~~~h1
Argentina'  0.03,7  0.55  37  0.83  0.65
Brazil2  0.S065$  v  00  t0.  R4! S  i  t  0  0  s0000  l92  $0.14  >t  ;  0.250  D  40.93
Chile3 0.060  0.60  0.11  0.27  0.88
C3li,bia'  004  0.  0W16  0.28  02
Ecuador'  0.065  0.52  0.24  0.49  0.90
Mexico3 00043  0.1  .3  0  0.877
PeruX  0.060  0.75  0.12  0.47  0.79
Regarding the  anticipation of  crises,  the  selected models  do  fairly  well  signaling  in
advance the extreme risk situations.  However there are big  differences across countries
in the distribution of the signals within the 24-month period prior to the crisis (Table 6).
In Brazil, Chile and Peru the signals are evenly distributed, with half the signals taking
place in the 12 months prior to the crisis.  The least anticipation is registered in Ecuador,
Mexico and Venezuela, where close to 50% of the signals took place within 6 months of
the crisis.  The most delayed response happens in Argentina, where in the year prior to
the crisis only 40% of the signals are issued.
=.~~~~ro  toC  a=rii
Arenin  1.-  0X:i-d  . 2.1  ... '.  100
Brazil  18  36  54  90  100
Chile  0  t;0  2Xt0  35  56  - X  G-  N0Nt 78  t1oo00,
Colombia  19  37  61  85  100
Ecuado  '\ugrrEtf0jwaSAEl;0  29'  '<ijj51  95  99  10000000040
Mexico  25  49  71  90  100
eezu  l  22  31  50  4  775  100
Venezuela  31  46  74  95  10011
C.  Introducing the Stock Market Price information 1986:01-1998:04
In  the previous  section  we  saw how  the best  models were,  in  general,  the ARIMA
residuals model and the simple one.  In this  section we'll  add the stock market price
index  in  real  terms  to  the  list  of  leading  indicators.  Our  modified  IMV  is
IMVEQ(including equity prices) defined as:
IMVEQ= REER + DCG + M2/R + ;z-+  EQ
Where EQ = stock market price in local currency deflated by the CPI.
The  cost  of introducing  this  variable  is  loosing valuable  information from  the  early
eighties, since our source of consistent information for most countries (IFC) reports it
since 198615.
We conclude that stock market prices are an informative variable of vulnerability based
on two tests. First, simple Granger causality tests of the IMV with  stock market prices
(labeled IMVEQ) and without them  and the Index of Speculative Pressure (ISP), point at
the  value  of  the information  content  of  stock  prices.  And  second,  the comparison
between  the  four  alternative models  (DT,  Simple, Chartist  and  Residuals)  with  and
without stock market prices (resulting in a total of 8 models) shows that including stock
market prices  is a  superior strategy than the  alternative (Appendix  1 shows the  four
statistics for each model). Table 7 summarizes the model selection information; recall
the unconditional probabilities of crisis during this sample period (Table 3A) to see the
gains in using these models. The signal distribution in the 24-month window prior to the
crisis (Table 8) shows that the timing signal-crisis does not change significantly when
stock prices are included and the sample period is shortened.
Table  7-
Model  Selection  According  to D  Eifferrt, Evaluatii  Criteria (IMVE~~Q  peid  ilo  ti  -:8  -----
Miii.  Type  I  Miii.  Type  I  Miii~...............  - . Ma..  ..  IS
+Type  II etrrors  rror  N-:se-Sigal
Argentina  Simple  Residuals  DT  DT
Brazil  Chartist  Chartist  Chartist  Chartist
Chile  Simple  Simple  Simple  Simple
Colombia  Residuals  Residuals  DT  DT
Ecuador  Residuals  Residuals  Residuals  Simple
Mexico  Residuals, Simple  Residuals  Simple  Simple
Peru  Simple  Residuals  Simple  simple
Venezuela  Simple  Residuals  Simple  Simple
15 For Peru the information exists since 1990, and for Ecuador since 1995.  Hence Ecuador's IMV does not
include this information.12
Argentina  16  34  Nta72  100
Brazil  21  43  57  91  100
Chile  14  28  51  74  100
Colombia  16  36  67  81  100
Ecuar  &  20  37  83  98  100
Mexico  15  36  57  94  100
Venezuela  29  50  85  100  100
D. Plenty Out of Sample Testing: (Brazil 99 Ecuador 99 Colombia 98 Mexico 94)
Three crises (Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia) have taken place in our group of countries
since we finished the first draft of our paper (July,1998).  In this section we show how :he
models predicted the vulnerabilities in each of them.  Additionally, we'll  see how ilhis
methodology would have predicted the Tequila crisis.  The methodology  is based  o:l
estimating  an ARIMA  model for the  IMVEQ,  using  a five  year rolling  sample,  ; nd
beginning two years prior to each crisis.  A signal will be generated in each of the 24
months of the window prior to the crisis.
In  the case  of the  Brazilian crisis  (Jan/99), we  estimated  an  ARIMA  model  for  Ihhe
IMVEQ beginning in January 97, with monthly information since Jan 92. For Febru:Lrv
97, the same procedure is repeated with information since February 92, and so on.  1 he
signal is flashed when the six-month moving average exceeds zero.  Graph I summariz es
the evolution of the leading indicator derived from the Arima-residuals model, show:ing
that 10 signals were issued in the 24-month window prior to the crisis.  Graph 2 is -he
leading indicator derived from the chartist model, showing that  13 signals were issuLe(d
prior to the crisis.
Exactly the same procedure was followed to study the crisis that took place in Ecuador  in
February,1999.  Graphs 3 and 4 summarize the signals sent by the Arima residual moJ:LeL
and the chartist  one  (chosen  simply because  of its  computational ease): the  first cne
signaled 23 times and the second one 20 times in the 24-month pre-crisis period.  For lihe
Colombian  crisis  of  September/98  the  same  approach  is  taken  and  the  results  ,  rc
summarized in Graphs 5  and 6.  The residuals model flashed 14 signals while the chart sil
one did it 10 times.13
Finally, the  exercise is  replicated to  see how the  models would  have anticipated the
Mexican crisis of December 94.  Graphs 7 and 8 show that theses tools would have been
useful in signaling the vulnerability experienced by the Mexican economy.  In the 24-
month window prior to the crisis, the residuals model issued 20 signals, while the chartist
one flashed them 14 times.
Graph  1  Graph  2
Sig  nals  of  Macro  Vulnerability  Preceding  Brazil's  Crisis  Sig  nal  of Macro  Vulnerability  Preceding  Brazil's Crisis
Arina residuals  nodel  Chartist  Model
0.2-  2
0.1  1
00  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 
0.0 -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
-1  - X  -
-2-
-0.3  -4-
97:01  97:07  97:01  9807
(a sig  nal  is flashed  when  the  indicator  is positive)  (a sig nal is flashed  if the  dashed  line exteeds  the  solid one)
Graph  3  Graph  4
Signals  of  Macro  Vulnerability  Preceding  Ecuador's  Crisis  Signals  of Macro  Vulnerability  Preceding  Ecuador's  Crisis
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Graph  5  Graph  6
Sig  nals  of  Macro  Vulnerability  Preceding  Colombian  Crisis  Signals  of lVbcro  Vulnerability  Preceding  Colombian  Ciisi  s
Arima residuals  model  Chartist  model
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(a signal is flashed  when  the indicator  is positive)  (a signal is flashed  when  the dashed  line exceE!Js  the solid one)
Graph  7  Graph  8
Sig  nals  of Macro  Vulnerability  Preceding  Me)acan  Crisis  Signals of Nbcro Vulnerability Preceding IlJxican Cnis;is
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(a signal is  flashedwhen  the indicator  is positive)  (a signal is flashed when the dashed line exceeds  tie solid one)
V. Conclusions and Agenda for Future Developments of this Project
The Early Warning System models presented for the group of Latin American countrie s
do a good job in anticip.ating  vulnerability to crises.  The limited set of variables clear' y
indicate periods when crises are more likely to happen.  However, Type I and II errors aie
still  high, though  smaller than previous  papers  have found  This  can be because tie
models  need  improvenment or  simply  because  crisis  are  events  that  are  inherently
unpredictable.  At  this  point, with  the tools  we  used  it's  impossible to  tell.  We' [e
inclined to believe it's  more the first reason.  Therefore, a mechanical application of tl e
signals issued by these models can lead to a false sense of security or to unwarranted
nervousness at some poinits. The country analyst's criteria is in no moment substituted by
these tools.
Several modifications are in line within this project.  Among the most important is thie
inclusion of external interest rates.  We begun this  work and this variable seems more15
important for some countries (Mexico) than for others.  Including the price of certain
commodities, like oil for Venezuela and Ecuador should also improve results.  Similarly,
incorporating information on the state of the real sector is crucial.  We have begun this
work with  excellent results  for most  countries (Appendix Tables 2  and 3). However,
increasing the dimension of the vector of leading indicators is done at a cost of additional
complexity.  To  deal  with  the  dimensionality  problem,  a  common  unobserved
component model could be  estimated.  There are two  options on this front: a. If this
component is continuous and enters linearly in the postulated relationships, then it can be
estimated via a Kalman filtering technique as proposed by Stock and Watson (1991)16.
On the other hand if this  component has  a non linear behavior  and is discontinuous,
switching from one regime to another, then Hamilton's (1989)17  estimation technique can
be used, as has already been done for the EMS countries'8.
16 Stock,  J.  and M. Watson  (1991)  "A probability  model of the coincident  economic  indicators",  in
Leading  Economic  Indicators,  ed. K. Lahiri  and  G. Moore.  Cambridge  University  Press.
"Hamilton, J. (1989) "A new approach  to the economic  analysis of non-stationary  time series and the
business  cycle", Econometrica  57 pp.357-84.
18  Maria Soledad  Martinez  "A regime-switching  approach  to the study  of speculative  attacks:  a focus  on
EMS crises". UC Berkeley, Nov/97.16
Ar9entna  0.78 U.07  0.34  0.88 0.50 0.24  0.48  0.66  0.51 0.54  1,09  0.65  0.49 0.30  0.59  0  77
Brailt  0,.2  0.42  2.31  0.58  0.57  0.24  0.56  0.90  0.47 0.24  0.  ;  0.93 0.44 0.38  0.68  0,90
Chile  0.75 0.23  0.90  0.57 0.40 0.13  0.22  0,84  0.56-  0.41  0.92  0,56 0.47 0.51  0.96  0.55
Colob 0.75 0.00  00  1.00 0.52 0.33  0.70  0.21  0.0  ,  0.  4  0.35 0.10  0.16  091
Ecuador"  0.79 0.11  0.49  0.87  0.41 0.26  0.45  0,83
tMexico 0.67  0.04  0.11  0.  06  02  0.05  0.9  0g.51  G.A  0.85  0.62  0  0.30  0.50  0.76
iPeru  t0.90- 0.27  2.78  0.29 0.42 0.13.  0.22  0.60  0.77 .0.52  2.29  0025  0.52 0.54  1.13  0.31
Verezuela  0.5  20 00.2057  0.  0..0.04  10.23  ;  0  .95'  0  .5  033  :0. 01  0a.8  0:42 02  0.4  0.39
2 Differenced  Arima  residual  model  in  the  case  of  Brazil,  Die  and  Peru.
In  the  case  of  Ecuador  the  comparison  is  made  between  the  Arima  Residual  Model  and  the  simple  model,  both  of  them  without  equity  prices.  __  __
Argentina  0.78 0.07  0.34  0.88 0.70 0.14  0.47  0.86  0.59 0.53  1.27  0.67 0.52  0.30  0.63  t.31
Brazil  0.82 0.42  2.31  0.58 0.72 0.33  1.1  0.84  0.35 0.76  U1.1  0,84  0.56 042  1.02  (.84
Chile  .0.75.  0.23  . 090  0.57 0.51 0.02  0.04  0.97 .0.65  0  1.70  0.43 0.64 0.50  1.38  0.48
Colmbia  0.75 0.00  0.00  1.00 0.54  -- 0.0  0.10 O  .95  0O0 0.47  1.17  0.75  .4  0.12  0.23  (.C9
Ecuador":  0.89 0.11  0.95  0.43  0.52 0.61  1.27  0.44  .0.57  0.39  0.93 0 56
Mexico  0.67 9004  0.11  0.93 0  .63 0.05  0,14  0.91  0.56 041M 0.94  0.66 0.44 0.41  2.73  F0'0
Peru  0.90 0.27  2.78  0.29 0.29 0.13  0.18  0.69  0.80 0.52  2.56  0.18 0.  19 .0.43  3.53  040
Venezuela  0.85 0.20  0.57 0  .86 0OR.52  0.09  . 0.20  0.91  053.0.-  0.80  0.82 0.32 0.10  3.14  0  95
± Venezuela  industrial  production  index  was  avaiable  from  1989.  Ecuador  IP  was  available  only  from  1990.17
Appendix:  Table  3
Summary,  ,fBest  Modtls  Statbtiesfrach  Cotry  (including  IP  1986  - 18
Unconditninal.  Type I elror  Type X1  errr  Noise/Sipna  ratio  P(CtS
Probability
Argentina'  .049  0.70  0.14  0.47  0.86
Brazil  92  2  0.47  0.24  0.45  0.93
Chile'  .028  0.51  0.02  0.04  0.97
Colombia'  .035  0.54  0.05  0.10  0.95
Ecuador 3 .063  0.41  0.26  0.45  0.83
Mexico '  .049  0.63  0.05  0.14  0.91
Peru l  .077  0.29  0.13  0.18  0.69
Venezuela3 .056  0.32  0.10  0.14  0.97
Notes:  I/ Simple  Modef  2/ Chartist  Model  3/ Residuals  Model.  In  the  case  of Ecuador  the  Residuals
model  gave  as good  results  as the  Simple  model.Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
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